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TORT LAW-THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM'S WRONGFUL CONCEPTION 
OF "WRONGFUL LIFE"-Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 
954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Genetic defects and diseases have been recognized for centuries, 
but recent advances in the field of genetic research now permit 
health care providers to predict whether two individuals are likely to 
produce an impaired child. l When testing is performed accurately, 
potential parents are afforded the opportunity to consciously decide 
whether to conceive a child who might possibly be deformed. But if 
a physician is negligent, the parents are denied such a choice and the 
birth of a severely handicapped or diseased infant often results. 2 
Consequently, the courts have increasingly been called upon to adju­
dicate wrongful life suits.3 
There are two different types of wrongful life actions. The first 
type involves the birth of a healthy, but unplanned, child. These 
cases usually arise as a result of faulty birth control methods, negli­
gent sterilization, or illegitimacy.4 The other wrongful life action 
involves the birth of a diseased or deformed child. These cases are a 
result of a health care provider's failure to warn an infant's parents 
I. Peters & Peters, Wrongful Life: Recognizing the Defective Child's Right to a 
Cause ofAction, 18 DUQ. L. REv. 857 (1980); Note, Father andMother Know Best: Defin­
ing the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488 
(1978). 
2. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr.477 
(1980); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Park v. Chessin, 60 AD.2d 80, 
400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), mod(fied, Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 
413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981). 
3. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 
(1980); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 
22, 227 A2d 689 (1967), overruled in part, Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A2d 8 
(1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); 
Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80,400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), mod(fied, Becker v. Schwartz, 46 
N.Y.2d 401,386 N.E.2d 807,413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital, 
69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). 
4. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Stills v. Grat­
ton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 
240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964); Williams v. State, 25 
A.D.2d 907, 269 N.Y.S.2d 786 (l966),affd, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343,276 N.Y.S.2d 
885 (1966). 
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that there is a substantial likelihood that the child will be born with 
some type of disease or deformity.s The scope of this analysis will be 
limited to wrongful life suits that are brought by impaired children.6 
The infant plaintiff in such a case claims that if his parents had 
been accurately informed that they were likely to produce a de­
formed child, either he would never have been conceived or would 
have been aborted.7 The fundamental premise of the child's claim is 
that he has been harmed by having been born impaired.s The in­
fant does not allege that the physician's negligence caused his im­
pairment, rather he argues that the negligence caused his conception 
and birth.9 Thus, the plaintiff does not claim that he was denied the 
right to be born "whole", but that he was denied the right not to 
have been born at all. lO He views life itself as a compensable injury 
and argues that but for the physician's incompetence, he would not 
have had to experience the pain and suffering of living in a diseased 
or deformed state. II 
Recently, the Supreme Court of California considered such a 
cause of action for the first time. In Turpin v. Sortini,12 the court 
found that impaired life is not always more valuable than nonexis­
tence,13 and became the first court in the nation to specifically recog­
nize that plaintiffs in wrongful life suits may suffer a compensable 
injury, while at the same time denying recovery simply due to the 
difficulty of measuring damages. 
To fully explain the court's response to this claim, it is necessary 
to outline the development of the judiciary's response to wrongful 
life claims. The analysis of the Turpin court will then be compared 
to the courts' traditional response. Finally, the Turpin court's rea­
soning will be critiqued and a viable alternative to its treatment of 
the claim for damages will be suggested. 
5. See supra note 2. 
6. When the birth of a child produces harmful consequences, two different causes 
of action may be brought. A ''wrongful life" action may be brought by the child or a 
''wrongful birth" action may be brought by the parents. Note, "Wrongful L!fe'~' The 
RighI NOllo be Born, 54 TuL. L. REv. 480, 483-85 (1980). 
7. Id. at 485. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 485, 491. 
10. Id. at 497. 
11. Id. at 485, 497. 
12. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982). 
13. Id. at 234, 643 P.2d at 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346. 
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II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF WRONGFUL LIFE 
The Supreme Court of California's decision in Turpin repre­
sents the typical result in wrongful life suits. Although the rationales 
used to support such decisions vary greatly, consistently every state 
court of last resort that has considered this issue, has uniformly de­
nied the infant's claim for general damages. 14 
Under traditional tort principles, a plaintiff can only recover if 
he can establish both that he has suffered a legally cognizable injury 
and that there is an acceptable method of calculating damages. IS 
Courts have justified their denial of damages in wrongful life contro­
versies by concluding that either one or both of these conditions has 
not been met. 16 
The first case to address a wrongful life claim brought by a 
physically impaired infant was Gleitman v. Cosgrove,l7 In Gleitman, 
the plaintiffs mother contracted German measles while she was 
pregnant. IS Because her physician informed her that her unborn 
child would not be harmed by the virus, she decided not to seek an 
abortion. 19 As a result of this misinformation, she gave birth to a 
child who had substantial defects in hearing, sight and speech capa­
bilities.20 The child brought suit claiming wrongful life, but was de­
nied relief.21 The court reasoned that life with defects is always 
more precious than not being born at all,22 and that it is "logically 
impossible"23 to ''weigh the value of life with impairments against 
the nonexistence of life itself'24 in order to calculate damages. 
14. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 430, 404 A.2d 8, 13 (1979); Gleitman v. Cos­
grove, 49 N.J. 22, 31, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967), overruled in porI, Berman v. Allan, 80 
N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 412,386 N.E.2d 807,812, 
413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901; Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 89, 100, 439 A.2d 110, 116, 122 
(1981) (by an evenly divided court); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital, 69 Wis. 2d 766, 
773, 233 N.W.2d 372, 376 (1975). 
15. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971). 
16. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. at 429, 404 A.2d at 12 (no cognizable injury is pri­
mary concern); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692 (no cognizable 
damages); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d at 411-12,386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 
900 (neither cognizable injury nor measurable damages); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospi­
tal, 69 Wis. 2d at 772-73, 233 N.W.2d at 375-76 (unmeasurable damages). 
17. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967), overruled inporl, Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 
404 A.2d 8 (1979). 
18. 49 N.J. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690. 
19. Id. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691. 
20. Id. at 25, 227 A.2d at 690. 
21. Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692. 
22. Id. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693. 
23. Id. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692. 
24. Id. 
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Courts today are still following either one or both of these 
rationales.25 
A decade later, Gleitman was partially overruled by Berman v. 
Allan .26 Mrs. Berman became pregnant at age thirty-eight and Dr. 
Allan cared for her throughout her pregnancy.27 Although the risk 
of bearing a child afllicted with Down's Syndrome28 was substan­
tiaP9 for a woman of her age, Dr. Allan failed to either advise her of 
the possibility that her child might be born with the aflliction, or 
recommend that she undergo the procedure of amniocentesis,30 
which is an accurate way of determining whether there may be chro­
mosomal abnormalities.31 Mrs. Berman subsequently gave birth to a 
daughter who was afllicted with Down's Syndrome.32 . 
The child sued the doctor on the basis of a wrongful life claim, 
but her cause of action was rejected.33 The court concluded that the 
plaintiff had "not suffered any damage cognizable at law by being 
brought into existence."34 Yet, the court did make one small step 
toward recognizing a cause of action for wrongful life by rejecting 
the argument that the difficulty of measuring damages in wrongful 
25. See supra notes 14, 16. 
26. 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8 (1979). 
27. Id. at 423-24, 404 A.2d at 10. 
28. Id. at 424, 404 A.2d at 10. Down's Syndrome, which falls within the group of 
congenital defects and symptoms seen in mongolism, is "[a] form of idiocy or mental 
retardation the physical features of which are characterized by obliquely set eyes, open 
mouth, flabby muscles, soft skin, broad face, etc. . . .In most cases there is a chromo­
somal abnormality marked by the presence of three number 21 chromosomes (instead of 
two)." SCHMIDT, ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER M-129 
(17th ed. 1982). Other abnormalities associated with Down's Syndrome "include re­
tarded growth, flat hypoplastic face with short nose, prominent epicanthic skin folds, 
protruding lower lip, small rounded ears with prominent antihelix, fissured and thick­
ened tongue, laxness of joint ligaments, pelvic dysplasia, broad hands and feet, stubby 
fingers usually with dysplasia of the middle phalanx of the fifth finger, transverse palmar 
crease, dermatoglyphic changes including distal displacement of the palmar axial 
triradius, dry rough skin in older patients and abundant slack neck skin in newborns, and 
muscle hypotonia and absence of Moro reflex in newborns. . . ." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL 
DICTIONARY 1386 (24th ed. 1982). 
29. Berman, 80 N.J. at 425, 404 A.2d at 10. 
30. Amniocentesis is a "[t]ransabdominal aspiration of fluid from the amniotic 
sac." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 53 (24th ed. 1982). "This procedure is used to 
remove and study part of the amniotic fluid (the fluid in the 'bag of waters')...." 
SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER 53 (17th ed. 
1982). 
31. 80 N.J. at 424, 404 A.2d at 10. 
32. Id. 
33. /d. at 430, 404 A.2d at 13. 
34. Id. at 429, 404 A.2d at 12. 
497 1983) WRONGFUL LIFE 
life suits justified the denial of recovery.35 The court expressly stated 
that it "would be extremely reluctant. . . to deny the validity of. . . 
[the] complaint solely because damages are difficult to ascertain."36 
It went on to state that "were the measure of damages. . . [its] sole 
concern, it is possible that some judicial remedy could be fashioned 
which would redress [the] plaintiff ...."37 
The first case in which a court recognized a cause of action for 
wrongful life was Park v. Chessin .38 Mrs. Park gave birth to a child 
with a kidney ailment and the child died shortly thereafter.39 Dr. 
Chessin negligently assured Mrs. Park that the disease was not he­
reditary and that there was only a miniscule chance that she would 
subsequently give birth to another child with the same amiction.40 
In reality, the child was afflicted with polycystic kidney disease, a 
hereditary and fatal disorder.41 As a result of Mrs. Park's reliance 
on the misdiagnosis, she conceived and gave birth to a second 
child.42 That child was also born with polycystic disease and died 
two and a half years later.43 The Parks sued for wrongful life on 
behalf of their second child and the court awarded damages for the 
pain and suffering that the child had endured during his lifetime.44 
Recovery was based upon "the fundamental right of a child to be 
born as a whole, functional human being."45 The very next year, 
35. Id. at 428, 404 A.2d at 12. 

. 36. Id. 

37. £d. (emphasis in original). 
38. 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified, Becker v. Schwartz, 46 
N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). 
39. 60 A.D.2d at 83, 400 N.Y.S.2d at Ill. 
40. Id. 
41. Polycystic kidney disease is a condition "characterized by. . . multiple cysts of 
varying size scattered diffusely throughout both kidneys, resulting in compression and 
destruction of kidney parenchyma ..." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 747 (24th 
ed. 1982). It is "a progressive disease ...resulting in compression and destruction of 
k[idney) parenchyma, usually with hypertension, gross hematuria, and uremia ...." 
Id. 
42. 60 A.D.2d at 83, 400 N.Y.S.2d at Ill. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114. 
45. Id. The court based recovery on the right of a child to be born unimpaired. It 
calculated damages by comparing the plaintiffs condition with that of a normal child. 
This method penalizes the defendant too heavily. The defendant was negligent in failing 
to inform the plaintiffs parents of the possibility that the plaintiff would be impaired, not 
in causing the impairment. The defendant caused the plaintiff to be born, but could not 
have prevented the deformity. Thus, the proper measure of damages is equivalent to the 
value of having not been born at all rather than the value of being born healthy, since the 
plaintiff could not have been born healthy under any circumstances. Id. 
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however, Gleitman was overruled.46 
The only other decision to recognize a cause of action for 
wrongful life was Curlender v. Rio-Science Laboratories.47 Mr. and 
Mrs. Curlender, the plaintiff's parents, retained Bio-Science Labora­
tories to administer certain tests designed to determine whether 
either of them was a carrier of genes that would result in the concep­
tion and birth of a child with Tay-Sachs disease.48 The laboratory 
was negligent in performing the tests and incorrectly informed the 
Curlenders that they were not carriers of the disease.49 Relying upon 
this information, they conceived a child who was born with Tay­
Sachs disease. 50 The infant sued for wrongful life and the court held 
that the child could recover both general damages for pain and suf­
fering, and special damages for the costs of treating the disease. 5 I 
The California court of appeals rejected the argument that a child 
born with a serious hereditary defect had not suffered a legally cog­
nizable injury.52 The court also refused to adopt the argument that it 
was impossible to measure damages in such a case. 53 It specifically 
rejected "the notion that a 'wrongful life' cause of action involves 
any attempted evaluation of a claimed right not to be bom."54 In­
stead, it chose to measure the injury to the child by comparing the 
pain and suffering that she would endure during her life, with the 
pain and suffering endured by a normal child with an average 
46. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401,386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). 
In Becker, the court denied recovery to a plaintiff who was afflicted with Down's Syn­
drome. It reasoned that the plaintiff had suffered no legally cognizable injury since a 
child does not have a "fundamental right. . . to be born as a whole, functional human 
being." Id. at 411, 386 N.E.2 at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. Furthermore, it reasoned that 
even if the child was injured, damages were not ascertainable. Id. at 412,386 N.E.2d at 
812, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 900. 
47. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980). 
48. /d. at 815, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480. Tay-Sachs disease is a "familial disease af­
fecting children of various ages, from four months to twelve years. It is characterized by 
partial or complete loss of vision, mental underdevelopments, softness of the muscles, 
convulsions, etc. Known as Tay-Sachs disease, cerebromacular degeneration, and Bat­
ten-Mayou's disease." SCHMIDT, ArrORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD 
FINDER A-141 (17th ed. 1982) (emphasis omitted). Tay-Sachs disease is an infantile type 
of "cerebral sphingolipidosis." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1314 (24th ed. 1982). 
Cerebral sphingolipidosis refers to "anyone of a group of inherited diseases character­
ized by failure to thrive, hypertonicity, progressive spastic paralysis ... occurrence of 
blindness, usually with macular degeneration and optic atrophy ...." Id. 
49. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 815, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 831, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90. 
52. /d. at 830, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489. 
53. Id. at 831, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489. 
54. Id. at 830-31, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489. 
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lifespan.55 
III. THE TURPIN DECISION 
The first wrongful life suit to reach the Supreme Court of Cali­
fornia was Turpin v. Sortini.56 Mr. and Mrs. Turpin brought their 
first and only child to Dr. Adam Sortini, a hearing specialist, for 
diagnosis of a possible hearing defect. 57 Although Sortini concluded 
that the child's hearing was normal, she was actually totally deaf due 
to a hereditary ailment. 58 Relying upon the negligent diagnosis, the 
Turpins conceived a second child, Joy, who was afDicted with the 
same hereditary deafness. 59 The Turpins brought suit on behalf of 
Joy alleging that, had they known oftheir first daughter'S true condi­
tion, they would never have conceived a second child.60 Joy sought 
general damages for the pain and suffering that she experienced as a, 
result of being born deaf, as well as special damages to cover the 
extraordinary costs of treating the amiction.61 
The court first evaluated the claim for general damages. It 
found that the defendant owed a duty of care to Joy because it was 
reasonably foreseeable that any offspring of the Turpins' would be 
directly affected by their failure to discover the hereditary condi­
tion.62 In addition, it found "that Joy's birth was a proximate result 
of the breach" of that duty of care.63 It failed, however, to find that 
Joy had suffered any measurable injury as a result of the breach.64 
In analyzing the element of damages, the court specifically rec­
ognized that it "seems doubtful that a child's. claim for general dam­
ages should properly be denied on the rationale that the value of 
impaired life, as a matter of law, always exceeds the value of non­
life...."65 The court realized that there may be cases in which the 
child would be better off had he not been bom.66 Thus, it became 
55. Id. at 831,165 Cal. Rptr. at 489. Just like the Park court, the Curlender court 
used an incorrect method of calculating damages. See supra note 45. 
56. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982). 
57. Id. at 224, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 230, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 237, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347. 
65. Id. at 234, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346. 
66. Id. 
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the first court, using the proper standard for measuring damages,67 to 
conclude that it is possible for plaintiffs in wrongful life cases to suf­
fer a legally cognizable injury while at the same time denying a 
remedy.68 
The court declined to award general damages because it be­
lieved that it would be "impossible to determine in any rational or 
reasoned fashion whether the plaintiff has in fact suffered an injury 
in being born impaired rather than not being born ...."69 Fur­
thermore, the court argued that, even if it were possible to determine 
if any harm existed, it would be "impossible to assess general dam­
ages in any fair, nonspeculative manner."70 
In regard to special damages, the court held that a child could 
recover out-of-pocket expenses for treatment of a hereditary ail­
ment.7) The court reasoned that, unlike the claim for general dam­
·ages, special damages were easily determined and measured.72 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Mosk suggested that the ma­
jority's analysis ignored the established tort principal that every 
harm deserves a remedy.?3 He thought that an innocent plaintiff 
should not have to suffer simply because the injury was difficult to 
assess.74 
IV. ANALYSIS: ESTABLISHING AND MEASURING THE HARM 
Before a plaintiff can be awarded damages, the court must find 
that he has actually been harmed and the harm must be measurable. 
The courts have denied recovery in wrongful life suits for three ma­
jor reasons. Some reason that a plaintiff "has not suffered any dam­
age cognizable at law by being brought into existence."75 Others 
maintain that even if a harm exists, there is no possible way of mea­
suring it.76 Finally, another group of courts have granted recovery, 
but have measured damages by employing an improper standard.77 
67. See supra note 45. 
68. 31 Cal. 3d at 234-35, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346 (1982). 
69. Id. at 235, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 239,643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 241, 643 P.2d at 967, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 350 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
74. Id. at 240, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
75. Berman, 80 N.J. 421, 429, 404 A.2d 8, 12. 
76. Turpin,31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954-55, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337-38; Gleitman, 49 
N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689. 
77. Cur/ender, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811-13, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477; Park, 60 A.D.2d 80, 
400 N.Y.S.2d 110; See supra note 45 and infra note 80. 
501 1983) WRONGFUL LIFE 
In reviewing the major cases dealing with wrongful life, it be­
comes clear that the courts have made some small advances toward 
recognizing the cause of action. Yet, no court has adopted a satisfac­
tory method of assessing the plaintiffs' damages.78 All of the theories 
that have been employed seem to be flawed in one way or another.79 
Although it is unfair to make the defendant pay damages that would 
return the plaintiff to a position that he could never have occupied,80 
it is equally unjust to totally preclude a plaintiff from recovering any 
damages.81 It is absolutely necessary to formulate a method of de­
termining the existence and extent of damages that is fair to both the 
plaintiff and the defendant. 
A. Establishing the Harm 
Many arguments for the denial of damages have rested on the 
premise that all life, no matter how impaired, is better than no life at 
all.82 Thus, it is asserted that the wrongful life plaintiff suffers no 
legally cognizable injury.83 The child's preference for nonexistence 
is seen as devaluating the sanctity of life.84 
Decisions in "right to die" cases have rejected the premise that 
life is always more valuable than nonexistence and have deferred the 
choice to the impaired individua1.85 Yet, most courts continue to ad­
here to the argument that public policy supports an assignment of 
paramount value to the life in all circumstances.86 Although these 
78. The only cases in which the courts have even attempted to formulate a method 
of assessing damages are Park and Curlender. See supra notes 38-55 and accompanying 
text. 
79. See supra note 77. 
80. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 232,643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344. It is unfair to 
force the defendant to pay damages equal to the value of the difference between normal 
life and impaired life since the defendant caused the plaintiff to be born, but did not 
cause the impairment. Id. 
8!. Capron, Tort Liability and Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 618, 657 
(1979). !fit is obvious that the plaintiff has suffered an injury by being born, it is unjust 
to totally preclude recovery simply because damages are difficult to ascertain. Id. 
82. Berman, 80 N.J. at 429, 404 A.2d at 12; Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 30, 227 A.2d at 
693. 
83. Berman, 80 N.J. at 421, 404 A.2d at 8; Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 22, 227 A.2d at 689. 
84. Berman, 80 N.J. at 430,404 A.2d at 13; Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 30, 227 A.2d at 
693. 
85. Courts dealing with the right to die have recognized the individual's right to 
determine whether the value of life outweighs the value of nonexistence. Superintendent 
of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 745, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427 
(1977); Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,41-42, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976), cert. denied,429 
U.S. 922 (1976). 
86. Berman, 80 N.J. at 426-30, 404 A.2d at 12-13; see, e.g., Speck v. Finegold, 497 
Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (by an evenly divided court). 
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courts recognize the fact that "decisional law must keep pace with 
expanding technological, economic and social change",87 they 
choose to ignore the fact that public policy in this area has 
changed.88 Because the main advantage of the common law system 
is its inherent adaptability to change,89 courts should cease to rely 
upon outdated theories of public policy in order to support their 
decisions. 
Although the defendant's negligence sometimes confers a bene­
fit upon the plaintiff by enabling him to be born, this benefit does not 
always outweigh the burden that the child must bear as a result of 
his affiiction.90 It is obvious that "[eJxistence in itself can hardly be 
characterized as an injury, but when existence is foreseeably and in­
extricably coupled with a disease, such an existence, depending on 
the nature of the disease, may be intolerably burdensome."91 
If the plaintiff's parents have alleged that they would either 
have avoided conception or aborted had the physician given them 
accurate information regarding the likelihood of deformity, the 
courts should allow a jury to decide the question of whether the 
plaintiff has actually been harmed by having been born, rather than 
denying recovery as a matter of law.92 The jury would then deter­
mine whether a reasonable person, with the plaintiff's impairment, 
would prefer to never have been bom.93 The trier of fact should be 
allowed to determine whether the infant actually suffered an in­
jury.94 The question should be viewed not as a question of law, but 
as a question of fact. The courts should not be allowed to inject their 
moral judgments regarding the sanctity of life in order to bar recov­
ery in every case, regardless of the compelling nature of that case.95 
Injury to the child should be determined on a case by case basis, 
87. Park, 60 A.D.2d at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114. 
88. See supra note 85; see also Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 233, 643 P.2d at 962, 182 Cal. 
Rptr. at 345. "[A)t least in some situations-public policy supports the right of each 
individual to make his or her own determination as to the relative value of life and 
death." Id. 
89. 15A AM. JUR. 2D Common Law §§ I, 2 (1976). 
90. Speck v. FinegOld, 497 Pa. 77, 87, 439 A.2d 110, 115 (1981). 
91. Id. (Opinion in opposition to the result reached in this case). 
92. Peters & Peters, supra note I, at 865-66. Whether the jury or a judge acts as the 
trier of fact in a particular case, each case should be decided on its merits, rather than 
judicially foreclosing recovery as a matter of law. Id. 
93. Comment, "Wrongful L!fe'~' The RighI Nollo he Born, 54 TuL. L. REv. 480, 
498 (1980). 
94. Peters & Peters, supra note I, at 866. 
95. Id. 
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rather than by assuming that life is never an intolerable burden.96 
The court in Turpin rejected the argument that life is always 
sacred and recognized that, "[a]lthough it is easy to understand and 
to endorse these decisions' desire to affirm the worth and sanctity of 
less-than-perfect life, we question whether these considerations alone 
provide a sound basis for rejecting the child's tort action."97 They 
also found that public policy sometimes supports the righ~ of the in­
dividual to "make his or her own determination as to the relative 
values of life and death. "98 They concluded their analysis by stating: 
"[c]onsidering the short life span of many of these children and their 
frequently very limited ability to perceive the benefits of life, we can­
not assert with confidence that in every situation there would be a 
societal consensus that life is preferable to never having been born at 
all."99 
By concluding that it is possible for a plaintiff in a wrongful life 
suit to suffer an injury, the Turpin court rejected the notion that im­
paired life is always more valuable than nonexistence. tOO Yet, it 
failed to grant a remedy solely due to the difficulty of measuring 
damages. lOt 
B. M,easuring the Harm 
Even if a court accepts the argument that it is possible that a 
plaintiff in a wrongful life suit could suffer harm in certain cases, 
there is still another barrier for the plaintiff to overcome. The court 
must also be convinced that it is possible to ascertain whether the 
plaintiff has been harmed by being born and to what extent}02 The 
court in Turpin, like many other courts,103 refused to believe that it 
96. Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 87, 439 A.2d 110, 115 (1981) (opinion in opposi­
tion to the result reached in this case). 
To judicially foreclose consideration of whether life in a particular case is such 
a burden would be to tell the diseased, possibly deformed plaintiff that he can 
seek no remedy in the courts and to imply that his alternative remedy, in the 
extreme event that he finds his life unduly burdensome, is suicide. No court in 
the land would directly send such a message to these plaintiffs. [It is] unfortu­
nate that some courts have indeed sent that message by implication. 
Id. 
97. 31 Cal. 3d at 232-33,643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344. 
98. Id. at 233, 643 P.2d at 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345; see supra note 85. 
99. Id. at 234, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346. 
100. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 

IO\. 31 Cal. 3d at 234-35, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346. 

102. Id. 
103. See, e.g., Elliot v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 547-48 (Ala. 1978); Gleitman, 49 
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was possible to assess damages in an accurate manner.l04 It argued 
that it is "impossible to determine in any rational or reasoned fash­
ion whether the plaintiff has in fact suffered an injury in being born 
impaired rather than not being bom".lOs The court further stated 
that even if it were possible to determine when a harm existed, it was 
"impossible to assess general damages in any fair, nonspeculative 
manner."I06 Because both issues are resolved by applying the same 
formula, a comparison between the benefit of living, and the burden 
of being impaired, they will be considered together. 
The Turpin court held that wrongful life damages could not be 
calculated by juries because the value of nonexistence was not within 
the experience or imagination of any person. 107 Therefore, the court 
reasoned that it would be impossible for the jury to balance the ben­
efit') of living against the burdens of being impaired, in order to 
quantify the harm. \08 
This argument can be refuted in three ways. First, it is obvious 
that in the vast majority of tort cases the jury can only imagine what 
the plaintiffs life was like both before and after the injury. \09 It 
would be a very unusual case indeed if one or more members of the 
jury had experienced a life just like the plaintiffs before he was in­
jured and then suffered an injury which was very similar to the 
plaintiffs. I 10 Thus, in virtually every tort case, the members of the 
jury must judge whether the plaintiff has been harmed and the extent 
of the damage solely by listening to various types of testimony and 
making a determination based upon common sense and an assess­
ment of the witnesses' credibility rather than by relating the plain­
tiffs injuries to their own past experience. HI 
Secondly, juries regularly assess the amount of damages in 
wrongful death cases. In these suits, the jury must make the same 
t;omparison as is required in a wrongful life suit. The jury must 
measure damages by comparing the value of either impaired or 
N.J. at 26, 227 A.2d at 692; Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 402, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 
900. 
104. 31 Cal. 3d at 23S, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346. 

lOS. Id. 

106. Id. 
107. Id. at 23S-36, 643 P.2d at 963-64, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346-47 (quoting Speck v. 
Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 372, 408 A.2d 496, SI2 (Spaeth, J., concurring and dissent­
ing), a./!'d, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981).). 
108. Id See also infra notes IIS-27 and accompanying text. 
109. See infra note 113. 
110. See supra note 81, at 6S8. 

Ill. Bryan v. Ross, 236 S.C. 299, 304, 114 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1960). 

505 1983] WRONGFUL LIFE 
healthy life with the value of nonexistence. 112 If the jury is capable 
of making this comparison in wrongful death suits, there is no reason 
to doubt their ability to make the same comparison in wrongful life 
suits. 
Finally, juries are called upon to assess damages in other situa­
tions in which the position of the plaintiff is very similar to a state of 
nonexistence. For example, juries are often called upon to measure 
the extent of injuries to plaintiffs who are comatose or severely brain 
damaged. l13 In such cases, the jury must compare a state of bare 
existence with that of a healthy existence. 114 These conditions are 
very close to nonexistence, yet, juries regularly assess damages for 
these types of injuries. 
In order for a jury to perform its proper function in determining 
damages, it is necessary to formulate some guidelines for it to fol­
10W. 115 Because juries are able to apply basic tort principles to other 
intangible injuries, that are equally beyond their powers of compre­
hension,116 there is no reason why these standards cannot be em­
ployed to determine the proper recovery in wrongful life suits. I 17 
The traditional tort remedy is compensatory in nature. I IS Dam­
ages are awarded in an attempt to place the plaintiff in the position 
that he would have occupied but for the tortious act of the defend­
ant.I 19 By this standard, damages for wrongful life would be 
equivalent to the value of the benefit of never having been born. 
112. See JUpra note 81 at 649; see infra note 142. 
lB. In Gainar v. S.S. Longview Victory, 226 F. Supp. 912, 917 (E.D. Va. 1964), 
the jury was allowed to assess damages to a plaintiff who "exists 'in body' but without the 
ability to function as a normal man ... [whose] total reaction makes him little more 
than flesh and bones which need attention for the balance of his life." In Myers v. 
Karchmer, 313 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. 1958), the court affirmed a $150,000 jury verdict to a 
plaintiff with complete mental and physical disability and loss of control of his kidneys. 
The court in Wolf v. General Mills, Inc., 35 Misc. 2d 996, 231 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1962), 
affirmed a $500,000 jury verdict to a plaintiff who was brain damaged as a result of a 
skull injury. The accident caused mental feebleness, impaired memory, loss of taste and 
smell, difficulty in hearing, total loss of sight in one eye and partial loss of sight in the 
other, total loss of hearing in one ear and draining of the other, facial paralysis and other 
injuries. In Seattle-First National Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 288,367 P.2d 835 (1962), 
the negligence of a doctor caused a pre-natal injury which resulted in permanent brain 
damage and cerebral palsy. In assessing damages, the jury compared the plaintiff's de­
gree of intelligence with that of a normal child. Id. at 841, 59 Wash. 2d at 296. 
114. Id. 
115. Note, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful L!fe'~' (A Suggested Analysis), 55 
MINN. L. REV. 58, 65-66 (1970). 
116. See infra notes 138-42. 
117. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 50, 227 A.2d at 704. 
118. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 55 (4th ed. 1971). 
119. Id. 
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The first step in ascertaining the extent of the injury would be to 
compare the condition that the child would have occupied had the 
defendant not been negligent, with the impaired condition which he 
now occupies as a result of the negligent act.120 This involves bal­
ancing the value of nonexistence against the value of an impaired 
existence. 121 The second step would be to determine whether the 
defendant had conferred any benefit upon the plaintiff by causing 
his birth. Tort law requires that the value of any benefit conferred 
upon the plaintiff be considered in mitigation of damages whenever 
it is equitable to do SO.122 
Essentially, a jury's task would be to balance the burdens and 
benefits in each case. The burden of living with an impairment 
would be balanced against the benefit, if any, that could be attrib­
uted to the joy of living. 123 Where a child's impairment is slight, the 
benefit of having been born would surely outweigh the injury, and 
no damages would be awarded. 124 Where a child is very severely 
impaired, however, the benefit of living might be negligible. 125 In 
such a situation it would be proper to award damages. 126 As the 
impairment becomes more severe, life becomes less precious and the 
recovery of a larger award is justified. 127 
The court in Turpin declined to apply such a formula because 
"a rational, nonspeculative determination of a specific monetary 
award in accordance with normal tort principles appears to be 
outside the realm of human competence."128 By denying a remedy, 
after acknowledging that an injury may exist, the court violated the 
basic tort principle that there should be a remedy for every wrong. 129 
This principle is so basic to the concept of justice that it has been 
asserted that it is the very thread of our society.130 From "the earli­
est days of organized society it became apparent to man that society 
could never become a success unless the collectivity of mankind 
guaranteed to every member of society a remedy for a palpable 
120. See supra note 115, at 64. 
121. Id. 
122. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979). 
123. See supra note 115. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 66. 
127. Id. 
128. 31 Cal. 3d at 236, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347. 
129. See supra note 73; see also Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555, 
563 (1931); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 738-39, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 
(1968). 
130. FlagieUo v. Pennsylvania Hospital, 417 Pa. 486, 489, 208 A.2d 193, 195 (1965). 
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wrong inflicted on him by another member of that society."'31 
The difficulty of measuring damages should not be the basis for 
a total denial of recovery. If it is determined that "a claim is legally 
cognizable, mere difficulty in the ascertainment of damages should 
be insufficient to preclude the action."132 
Our legal system does not require that the damages in every 
case be ascertainable to the extent that it provides an exact figure 
representing the proper remedy. The United States Supreme Court 
has stated that "[t]he rule which precludes the recovery of uncertain 
damages applies to such as are not the certain result of the wrong, 
not to those damages which are definitely attributable to the wrong 
and only uncertain in respect of their amount."133 In most wrongful 
life cases, there is no doubt that the physician proximately caused 
the child to be born. Yet the courts continue to bar recovery even 
though damages are only uncertain as to their amount. 134 It is ex­
tremely unjust to the injured infant to require a degree of precision 
that the law of torts does not demand. 135 The plaintiff should not be 
barred from recovery due to the unfortunate circumstances that he 
was the victim of a tortious act which produces injuries that are diffi­
cult to quantify.136 Indeed, it almost seems illogical to argue that we 
should grant no remedy at all simply because it is difficult to quanti­
fy the proper amount of compensation. 
The Turpin court denied the plaintiff a remedy based upon the 
argument that any award would be speculative. '37 Yet, wrongful life 
131. Id. at 490,208 A.2d at 195. 
132. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 542 (D.S.C., 1980). 
133. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931). 
134. See supra note 3. 
135. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931). "Where the 
tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of damages 
with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all 
relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend 
for his acts. In such cases, while the damages may not be determined by mere specula­
tion or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show[s) the extent of the damages as a 
matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result is only approximate. The 
wrongdoer is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured with the exactness 
and precision that would be possible if the case, which he alone is responsible for mak­
ing, were otherwise." Id. 
136. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 738-39, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 
(1968). "[T]he application of tort law can never be a matter of mathematical precision. 
In terms of characterizing conduct as tortious and matching a money award to the injury 
suffered as well as in fixing the extent of the injury, the process cannot be perfect .... 
Yet we cannot let the difficulties of adjudication frustrate the principle that there be a 
remedy for every substantial wrong." Id. 
137. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
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damages are no more speculative or difficult to measure than those 
awarded for injuries such as loss of earning capacity,138 decreased 
life expectancy,139 loss of consortium,14O emotional distress, 141 or 
wrongful death.142 "Surely a judicial system engaged daily in evalu­
ating such matters as pain and suffering, which admittedly have 'no 
known dimensions, mathematical or financial' should be able to 
evaluate the harm which proximately resulted from the breach of 
duty [in wrongful life cases]."143 It would be no more difficult for a 
jury to establish a monetary amount representing the difference be­
tween defective existence and nonexistence than for it to assess the 
value of these other intangible injuries. Although the Turpin court 
concluded that wrongful life damages would be too speculative l44 
the fact remains that the necessary computations are similar to other 
situations in the field of torts in which it is difficult, but certainly not 
impossible, to ascertain damages. 145 
138. In Wilson v. Northland Greyhound Lines, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 667, 675 (D.C. 
Mont. 1958), the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to be compensated not only for 
loss of earning capacity, but also for destruction of the capacity to pursue an established 
course of life. 
139. In Corcoran v. McNeal, 400 Pa. 14, 161 A.2d 367 (1960), the plaintiff was 
even allowed to recover for premature symptoms of aging. 
140. In Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel, 12 Cal. 3d 382,525 P.2d 669, liS Cal. Rptr. 
765 (1974) the plaintiff was granted damages for loss of consortium after her husband 
was severely injured after a steel beam fell on him while he was working. 
141. In Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968), a 
mother who saw her child struck and killed by a car was allowed to recover for negligent 
inftiction of emotional distress even though she did not have any reason to fear for her 
own safety. 
142. Juries have been given great latitude in assessing damages in wrongful death 
suits. City of Louisville v. Stuckenborg, 438 S.W.2d 94 (Ky. 1968) (granting damages for 
the wrongful death of a four day old child). In wrongful death suits, the jury calcula.tes 
damages by comparing the values of existence and nonexistence. To aid in this determi­
nation, the parties may submit evidence of the value of the decedent's life. 
"A plaintiff undoubtedly has the right in a wrongful death case to produce evi­
dence as to the age, health and activity of the decedent and other facts to show 
that a decedent would have lived a long time had his death not been accelerated 
by the wrongful act, and a defendant has the right in mitigation of damages to 
show the age, weakness, diseased condition, impaired earning power or lack of 
activity of decedent or any other facts tending to prove that the decedent would 
have lived only a very short time had his death not been so accelerated." 
Larrissey v. Norwalk Truck Lines, ISS Ohio St. 207, 215, 98 N.E.2d 419, 424 (1951). 
143. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 50, 227 A.2d at 704 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (quoting Botta 
v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 95, 138 A.2d 713, 720 (1958).). 
144. See supra notes 106, 128 and accompanying text. 
145. See supra notes 113, 138-42. 
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v. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of California had a chance to lead the way 
toward fairness by becoming the first state supreme court to recog­
nize a cause of action for wrongful life. Instead, it only went half 
way. While it recognized that the infant plaintiffs sometimes do suf­
fer a legally cognizable injury, it declined to endorse a solution to the 
problem. Rather than attempting to formulate an equitable method 
of assessing damages, it concluded that it was impossible for juries to 
assess damages in wrongful life suitS.l46 The time has come for the 
status quo to change, and for the injured plaintiffs' rights to relief to 
be recognized. The issue of damages should be decided by our ju­
ries, as it is in other tort cases. Damages can and should be assessed 
according to the traditional tort framework by balancing the benefit 
of living against the burden borne by the impaired plaintiff. The 
difficulty of ascertaining th~ existence of and measuring damages 
should not preclude the granting of a remedy in those cases in which 
actual injury is established. Justice requires that the defendants in 
wrongful life suits be required to redress the injuries that they have 
inflicted and that the impaired plaintiffs be compensated for their 
suffering. 
Dawn E Currier 
146. 31 Cal. 3d at 234-35, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346. 
